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Case Studies of African Agricultural 
Biotechnology Regulation: Precautionary and 
Harmonized Policy-Making in the Wake of the 
Cartagena Protocol and the AU Model Law 
R. NELSON GODFREY 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
In spite of increased, targeted investment in agricultural 
development across the African continent, production levels continue to 
lag and approximately one third of sub-Saharan Africa’s population is 
still chronically hungry.1 The reasons are numerous. Limited technical 
and scientific research capacity for crop improvement, skilled labor 
shortages, pricing and distribution problems, and environmental stresses 
all contribute to the problem. The stakes are high. As Malawi’s 
President, Bingu wa Mutharika, said on accepting the position of 
Chairman of the Africa Union (AU) Assembly in 2010: “One challenge 
we all face is poverty, hunger and malnutrition of large populations. . . . 
I would therefore request the AU Assembly to share the dream that five 
years from now no child in Africa should die of hunger and 
malnutrition. No child should go to bed hungry.”2 
“Biotechnology”3-based crop technologies have long been lauded 
as having the potential to help make agricultural production cheaper and 
easier on farmers,4 and have enjoyed a widespread and rapid rise. In 
 
 B.Sc.Hons., University of Saskatchewan 2007; JD, University of British Columbia 2011. The 
author is affiliated with the UBC Intellectual Property & Policy Research Group and has written 
extensively on intellectual property issues, as well as Canadian and international governance 
problems. The author would like to thank Emily Marden for her helpful comments.  
 1. Kevin J.A. Thomas & Tukufu Zuberi, Demographic Change, the IMPACT Model, and 
Food Security in Sub-Saharan Africa 1 (U.N. Dev. Programme, Working Paper No. 003, 2012), 
available at http://web.undp.org/africa/knowledge/WP-2012-003-thomas-zuberi-impact.pdf.  
 2. Dr. Bingu Wa Mutharika, President of the Republic of Malawi, Acceptance Speech on 
his election as the Chairman of the Assembly of the African Union 18−19 (Jan. 31, 2010); 
Demographic Change, supra note 1.  
 3. “Biotechnology” is defined in The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention 
on Biological Diversity, art. 3, 39 L.L.M. 1027 (Jan. 29, 2000) [hereinafter Protocol], for 
instance, as the application of techniques that “overcome natural physiological reproductive or 
recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in traditional breeding and selection.” Id. 
art. 3(i).  
 4. See Marion Motarim, et al., South Africa – Blazing a Trail for African Biotechnology, 22 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 37, 39 (2004); Emily Waltz, Plant Genomics’ Ascent, 28 NATURE 
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2009, 14 million farmers planted 134 million hectares of crops derived 
through biotechnology, up almost 10 million hectares from 2008.5 
Thirteen million of those farmers reside in emerging and developing 
countries.6 Widely used crops include those modified to express broad-
spectrum insecticidal proteins present in Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) 
bacteria,7 and crops modified to be resistant to common herbicides.8 
While most commentators agree that the crops may offer significant 
productivity advantages to the African farmer,9 some critics claim that 
the current generation of commercialized agricultural biotechnology 
products “was designed to supplement the capital- and input-intensive 
farming methods of commercial agriculture, not the low-input 
techniques employed by smallholder farmers in Southern Africa.”10 
Efforts are underway to change this, however. Collaborative projects are 
in progress to develop crops resistant to drought and other abiotic 
stresses.11 Biotechnology is also being leveraged to improve the 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 10 (2010) (The emergence of genomics-based characterization and mapping 
techniques have been widely recognized as having the potential to further influence and 
accelerate the impact of biotechnology-based techniques); Joel I. Cohen, Harnessing 
Biotechnology for the Poor: Challenges Ahead for Capacity, Safety and Public Investment, 2(2) J. 
OF HUM. DEV. 239, 240 (2001). (“[M]olecular characterization and genomics expand our 
knowledge of plant and livestock genomes, making new genes available that could not have been 
isolated before.”).  
 5. See Crop Biotech Update Special Edition: Predicted Second Wave of Biotech Growth 
and Development Begins, ISAAA (2009), available at http://isaaa.org/kc/ [hereinafter Biotech 
Update].  
 6. See id. Among the top seven producers of biotech crops worldwide, five of them (Brazil, 
Argentina, India, China, and Paraguay) are classified as “emerging and developing” economies in 
the International Monetary Fund’s 2010 World Economic Outlook Report.  
 7. For an early paper discussing this invention, see M. Vacek, A. Reynaerts & H. Hofte, 
Transgenic Plants Protected From Insect Attack, 328 NATURE 33 (1987), available at 
http://www.nature.com/nature/journal/v328/n6125/abs/328033a0.html.  
 8. See Video: Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, International Service 
for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, 2011, available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/videos/globalstatusreport2011/default.asp, for a discussion of how 
herbicide resistance (particularly to Monsanto’s Roundup) is present in approximately 80% of 
genetically modified crops currently in the ground.  
 9. For opinions and data supporting the widespread adoption of Bt varieties in developing 
countries, see Biotech Update, supra note 5; Matin Qaim & David Zilberman, Yield Effects of 
Genetically Modified Crops in Developing Countries, 299 SCIENCE 900 (2003); see P.N. 
Mwangi & A. Ely, Assessing Risks and Benefits: Bt Maize in Kenya, 48 BIOTECHNOLOGY AND 
DEV. MONITOR 6 (2001) and Marnus Gouse, et al., A GM Subsistence Crop in Africa: The Case 
of Bt White Maize in South Africa, 7 INT’L J. BIOTECHNOLOGY 84 (2005).  
 10. See NOAH ZERBE, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY RECONSIDERED: WESTERN 
NARRATIVES AND AFRICAN ALTERNATIVES, 81, 95–103 (2005); see VANDANA SHIVA, SOIL NOT 
OIL: ENVIRONMENTAL JUSTICE IN AN AGE OF CLIMATIC CRISIS (2008).  
 11. See Ani Grover et al., Understanding Molecular Alphabets of the Plant Abiotic Stress 
Responses, 80 CURRENT  SCI. 206 (2001);  see also Biotechnology and Food Security, FOOD AND 
AGRICULTURE ORGANIZATION OF THE UNITED NATIONS, 
http://www.fao.org/worldfoodsummit/english/fsheets/biotech.pdf; see also T. Umezawa, et. al, 
Engineering Drought Tolerance in Plants: Discovering and Tailoring Genes to Unlock the 
Future, 17 CURRENT OP. IN BIOTECH. 113 (2006); see also Y. Wang, et al., Molecular Tailoring 
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nutritional characteristics of numerous staple food crops.12  Commercial 
varieties of such crops “remain on the distant horizon”13 (with a few 
exceptions, such as vitamin A-enriched Golden Rice),14 but research 
efforts have been promising.  In the right policy environment,15 this next 
generation of agricultural biotechnology products could make a world 
of difference, not only for impoverished farmers, but also, critically, for 
Africa’s malnourished and vitamin-deficient populations.  
“Precautionary”16 attitudes have traditionally had a heavy influence 
on African participation in international and regional biosafety 
negotiations.17  The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the African 
 
of Farnesylation for Plant Drought Tolerance and Yield Protection, 43 PLANT J. 413 (2005); see 
also S.G. Mundree, et al., Prospects for Using Genetic Modification to Engineer Drought 
Tolerance in Crops, in PLANT BIOTECH: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF 
GENETICALLY MODIFIED CROPS 193, 193 (Nigel G. Halford ed., 2006); see also Water Efficient 
Maize for Africa, PROGRESS REPORT MARCH 2008-MARCH 2011 (African Agricultural 
Technology, Nairobi, Kenya); see also Pocket K No. 3L: Biotechnology for the Development of 
Drought Tolerant Crops, ISAAA, available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/pocketk/32/default.asp.  
 12. See Dietrich Rein & Karin Herbers, Enhanced Nutritional Value of Food Crops, in 
PLANT BIOTECHNOLOGY: CURRENT AND FUTURE APPLICATIONS OF GENETICALLY MODIFIED 
CROPS 91, 91−93 (2006) (discussing possible applications including modifications that would 
increase the bioavailable portion of nutrients such as Vitamin E, Vitamin A, iron, and zinc).  
 13. Zerbe, supra note 10, at 77.  
 14. See Xudong Ye, et al., Engineering the Provitamin A (Beta-Carotene) Biosynthetic 
Pathway into (Carotenoid-Free) Rice Endosperm, 287 SCIENCE 303 (2000); Ingo Potrykus, 
Golden Rice and Beyond, 125 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 1157 (2001).  
 15. See generally R. Zimmermann & M. Qaim, Potential Health Benefits of Golden Rice: a 
Philippines Case Study, 29 FOOD POL’Y 147 (2004) (noting that stable commercial lines of 
Golden Rice have been developed and that critics have suggested that its widespread adoption 
could make a significant impact in developing nations, but also that the technology has yet to be 
widely adopted due to biosafety, trade, and other constraints); see also Kym Anderson, et al., 
Genetically Modified Rice Adoption: Implications for Welfare and Poverty Alleviation, 20 J. 
ECON. INTEGRATION 771 (2004); see also Baorong Lu, Zhiping Song, & Jiakuan Chen, Can 
Transgenic Rice Cause Ecological Risks Through Transgene Escape?, 13 PROGRESS IN 
NATURAL SCIENCE 17 (2003); see also Harry A. Kuiper et al., Assessment of the Food Safety 
Issues Related to Genetically Modified Foods, 27 THE PLANT JOURNAL 503 (2001); see also Kent 
J. Bradford, et al., Regulating Transgenic Crops Sensibly: lessons from Plant Breeding, 
Biotechnology and Genomics, 22 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 439, 442 (2005).  
 16. The most widely cited iteration of the precautionary principle is found in the Rio 
Declaration on Environment and Development, “[w]here there are threats of serious or 
irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing 
cost-effective measures to prevent environmental degradation.” The application of 
“precautionary” approaches to regulating biotechnology products have been discussed at great 
length in the literature; while this article confines its discussion of “precaution” to provisions that 
limit the trade or use of biotechnology products in favor of health and biosafety interests, many 
commentators have persuasively noted that “precautionary” conceptions of biotechnology and 
GMOS must take into account the “risks” of not permitting trade or research in biotechnology 
and of closing one’s borders to its products. See Jonathan H. Adler, More Sorry Than Safe: 
Assessing the Precautionary Principle and the Proposed International Biosafety Protocol, 35 
TEX. INT'L L.J. 173 (2000); see also CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LAWS OF FEAR: BEYOND THE 
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE 13−34 (2d ed., 2005).  
 17. Protocol, supra note 3; see also African Union, African Model Law on Biosafety, AU 
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Union Model Law on Biosafety are two agreements concluded in the 
context of such negotiations that are notable for their emphasis on 
precaution and socioeconomic considerations as acceptable bases for 
the rejection of imported crops.18 To what extent have these instruments 
affected the development of existing biotechnology sectors on the 
continent, and to what extent will they affect the development of new 
regulatory policies in nations with emerging or nonexistent biosafety 
regimes?19 Have their purported harmonizing aims been achieved? This 
paper presents an overview of the agri-biotechnology regulatory 
schemes of South Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso—and discusses how 
the emergence of these three nations as leaders in African plant 
biotechnology, in the context of the Cartagena Protocol and the Model 
Law, contrasts with the way these international instruments have been 
characterized as reifying forces of precautionary, harmonized policy-
making in biotechnology. 
This paper is divided into five sections. Following the 
introduction, section I discusses the Cartagena Protocol and AU Model 
Law as instruments that purport to harmonize regulatory policies and 
institutionalize precautionary decision-making vis-à-vis biotechnology. 
Section II discusses the South African regulatory approach to 
biotechnology, as a case study of the oldest and most successful 
biotechnology sector on the continent. Section III discusses the lengthy 
commercialization delays experienced in Kenya, and the eventual 
passage of the Kenya Biosafety Act as aspects of a second case study of 
African agricultural biotechnology policy. Section IV examines the 
regulatory approach underpinning the recent explosion of Bt cotton as a 
commercial crop in Burkina Faso. The paper concludes in Section V 
with a discussion of the net impacts of attempts to harmonize 
precautionary policy in the existing agri-biotechnology regulatory 
landscape. 
II.  PRECAUTIONARY AND HARMONIZING INFLUENCES  
ON BIOTECHNOLOGY REGULATION IN AFRICA: THE CARTAGENA 
PROTOCOL AND THE AU MODEL LAW 
The early success and rapid rise of agricultural biotechnology in 
 
BIOSAFETY PROJECT (1999), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/hrst/biosafety/AU_Biosafety_2b.htm/.  
 18. Protocol, supra note 3; see also African Model Law on Biosafety, supra note 17.  
 19. See Status of Crop Biotechnology in Africa, Table 1: Status of Genetically Modified 
(GM) Crops in Africa, NEPAD, available at 
http://www.nepadbiosafety.net/subjects/biotechnology/status-of-crop-biotechnology-in-africa 
[hereinafter NEPAD Biotech]. According to the African Biosafety Network of Expertise (ABNE), 
there are over 20 African nations whose National Biosafety Frameworks may be characterized as 
“works in progress” and approximately 10 nations that have no National Biosafety Frameworks at 
all.  
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North American markets has been well-documented. Policymakers, 
farmers, and consumers in many less developed countries, by contrast, 
have responded to the technology with far more reticence.20 Three 
reasons are worth briefly mentioning: first, the general safety of 
biotechnology-based crops and their impact on biodiversity have been a 
subject of much debate amongst farmers and regulators in many 
developing nations;21 second, modified crops have historically been 
subject to significant trade barriers (relative to conventionally-bred 
varieties) in important trading partners of many African nations;22 and 
third, many first-generation agri-biotech products were developed by 
companies accused of pursuing broad international intellectual property 
protections to the purported detriment of entities, including the seed-
saving farmer23 and agricultural research centers that rely upon the 
ready availability of plant germplasm.24 
 
 20. Doreen Mnyulwa & Julius Mugwagwa, Agricultural Biotechnology in Southern Africa: 
A Regional Synthesis, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN S. AFR. 13, 29 
(Steven Were Omano & Klaus von Grebmer eds., 2005).  
 21. A short list of commonly-listed fears about the safety of plant biotech products includes: 
long-term consumption by humans or animals (particularly as a dietary staple) could have 
deleterious effects on them; proliferation of agricultural products with relative fitness advantages 
could out-compete traditional varieties or breed with them via cross pollination; engineered genes 
could spread to related species with deleterious consequences; and resistance to herbicides 
(Roundup) and pesticides (Bt toxin) could develop in response to their increased environmental 
presence. For early and influential articles discussing these risks and others, see Paul Berg, et al., 
Potential Biohazards of Recombinant DNA Molecule, 185 SCIENCE 303 (1974); see also James 
Tiedje, et al., The Planned Introduction of Genetically Engineered Organisms: Ecological 
Considerations and Recommendations, 70(2) ECOLOGY 297, 299 (1989); see also Philip J. Dale, 
Spread of Engineered Genes to Wild Relatives, 100 PLANT PHYSIOLOGY 13, 15 (1992); but see 
A.B. Salifu, The Role of Biotechnology in Meeting the Biodiversity Conservation Challenge of 
Africa, ASPECTS OF AFRICAN BIODIVERSITY 58 (Jacob Midiwo ed., 2010), where the author notes 
that biotechnology could be used as a tool to help preserve biodiversity, if the appropriate 
scientific capacity is in place.  
 22. See Mnyulwa & Julius Mugwagwa, supra note 20, at 29. As a result, many farmers and 
regulators have held the view that the appearance of potential “contamination” of traditional 
varieties by transgenic seed could disproportionately affect the trade prospects of those traditional 
varieties; see also S. Herrera, Syngenta’s Gaff Embarrasses Industry and White House, 23 
NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 755 (2005). A prominent and well-publicized example is the 
StarLink™ case, where modified corn approved solely as animal feed was detected in US 
shipments destined for human consumption; see also J.L. Fox, Puzzling Industry Response to 
PodiGene Fiasco, 21 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 3 (2003).  
 23. See Monsanto v. Schmeiser, [2004] S.C.C. 34 (Can.) (the Canadian patent infringement 
case); see also VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 
(1997); A.G. Gold, Vanishing Seeds’ Cyclicality, 8(3) J. OF MATERIAL CULTURE 255 (2003).  
 24. For more details on the relevance of IP to open sharing of technical property in and 
among agricultural research centers, see Emily Marden & R. Nelson Godfrey, Intellectual 
Property and Sharing Regimes in Agricultural Genomics: Finding the Right Balance for 
Innovation, 17(2) DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 369 (2012); but see Joel I. Cohen & Robert Paarlberg, 
Explaining Restricted Approval and Availability of GM Crops in Developing Countries, 4 
AGBIOTECHNET 1–3 (2002), for a compelling argument that the enforcement of intellectual 
property rights alone cannot explain the slow uptake of biotechnological crops in developing 
nations.  
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These considerations resonated with policymakers in numerous 
African nations, many of whom adopted precautionary policies in the 
1990s and early 2000s governing the importation and development of 
biotechnology products.25  Some such nations—according to several 
commentators, particularly those heavily influenced by NGOs and 
European trade policy26—implemented regulatory strategies that 
characterized biotechnology products as inherently hazardous, subject 
to quarantine, post-import milling, or outright rejection.27 To this day, 
restrictive policies and suspicious attitudes towards biotechnology 
remain deeply ingrained in some nations.28  
These same hesitations and suspicions are arguably reflected in 
regional and international negotiations on the subject of modified 
organisms and in international instruments on the subject such as the 
Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety and the African Union’s Model Law 
on Biosafety. 
A.  The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety 
The Cartagena Protocol—a product of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity’s explicit focus on “living modified organisms”29—
is the most authoritative international agreement on the subject of 
biosafety and living biotechnology products.30 The Protocol is a non-
mandatory agreement that supplies model policies for policymakers, 
 
 25. See generally The Need for Biosafety Regulatory Systems, NEPAD (2010), 
http://www.nepadbiosafety.net/about/need-for-biosafety-regulatory-systems.  
 26. See ROBERT PAARLBERG, STARVED FOR SCIENCE: HOW BIOTECHNOLOGY IS BEING 
KEPT OUT OF AFRICA Ch. 4 (2008).  
 27. In the midst of a 2002–2003 famine, for example, the governments of Zambia and 
Zimbabwe rejected food aid from the United States as “genetically altered” and “toxic” because 
GM seed in the shipments could not be distinguished from non-GM seed. See generally Jennifer 
A. Thomson, Regulatory Regimes for GE Crops in Africa, in GENETICALLY ENGINEERED CROPS: 
INTERIM POLICIES, UNCERTAIN LEGIS. 265 (Iain Taylor ed., 2007); see also Declan Walsh, 
America Finds Ready Market for Genetically Modified Food: The Hungry, THE INDEPENDENT, 
Mar. 30, 2000.  
 28. See Al-Amani Mutarubukwa, Strict Bio-Safety Law Stalls GM Maize Trials, AATF, 
available at http://www.aatf-africa.org/. Zambia maintains its ban on products of agricultural 
biotechnology, to this day.  
 29. Convention on Biological Diversity of the United Nations Conference on the 
Environment and Development, U.N. Doc. ST/DPI/1307 (June 5, 1992)  (entered into force Dec. 
29, 1993) reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 818  [hereinafter CBD], Article 8(g), at 6. (“Each party shall, as 
far as possible and where appropriate . . . [e]stablish or maintain means to regulate, manage or 
control the risks associated with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting from 
biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that could affect the 
conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity.”).  
 30. Protocol, supra note 3. As of February 2013, 166 nations are party to the Protocol, 
including many large producers of biotechnology products. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, 
Parties to the Protocol and Signature and Ratification of the Supplementary Protocol, 
CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY (last visited Mar. 23 2013), available at 
http://bch.cbd.int/protocol/parties/.  
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and while it leaves decisions on appropriate safety standards to national 
discretion, it represents an attempt to codify international consensus on 
“living modified organisms” (“LMOs”) and their impact on biosafety.31 
The regulatory provisions of the Cartagena Protocol are triggered by 
LMOs32 that “may have adverse effects on the conservation and 
sustainable use of biological diversity, taking also into account risks to 
human health.”33 The focus on LMOs distinguishes the Protocol from 
other relevant international instruments (including, e.g., the CBD and 
WTO agreements), and has the effect of separating plant biotechnology 
from traditional techniques as an area that “countries have decided 
needs collective actions on a global scale.”34  
 The Protocol focuses on two categories of LMOs, those intended 
for unconfined environmental release, governed by the advanced 
informed agreement (“AIA”) procedure, and those intended for 
consumption as food or feed products (“LMOs-FFP”).35 The AIA 
procedure is intended to ensure that importing countries are informed of 
the potential risks associated with the proliferation of LMOs and that 
they have the opportunity to refuse their entry.36 It mandates that 
exporters notify importers of impending trans-boundary movement of 
LMOs prior to the first instance of that movement and provide them 
with all relevant and available information on their safety.37 The 
provisions dealing with LMOs-FFP are similarly worded, differing 
mainly in procedural steps for the transboundary movement of LMOs. 
 The establishment of national risk assessment standards for 
LMOs is left to the sovereign discretion of parties, but generally, 
assessments must be performed “in a scientifically sound manner . . . 
and [take] into account recognized risk assessment techniques.”38 
Importantly, regulators may take relevant socio-economic 
 
 31. See G. Jaffe, Implementing the Cartagena Biosafety Protocol Through National 
Biosafety Regulatory Systems: An Analysis of Key Unresolved Issues, 5 J. OF PUB. AFF. 299, 304 
(2005).  
 32. Defined as “any living organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material 
obtained through the use of modern biotechnology,” Protocol, supra note 3, art. 3(g). “Living 
organism,” in this context, refers to “any biological entity capable of transferring or replicating 
genetic material, including sterile organisms, viruses and viroids” and “biotechnology” is defined 
as stated in note 3.  
 33. Id. art. 4 (emphasis added).  
 34. Jaffe, supra note 31, at 301.  
 35. Id.  
 36. Id.  
 37. Protocol, supra note 3, Annex 1. These include the characteristics of the organism and 
parental or donor organisms, centers of origin and genetic diversity, intended use of the 
organisms or products thereof, suggested methods for handling and use, and the regulatory status 
of the product in the country of export.  
 38. Id. art. 15(1). LMOs should also be assessed on a case-by-case basis, id. at Annex III.6, 
and risks should be evaluated in the context of the likely receiving environment, id. at Annex 
III.5.   
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considerations into account in making regulatory decisions at their 
discretion.39 The Protocol also contains novel, broad expressions of the 
precautionary principle within its operational sections, particularly 
when compared with the imprecise provisions of the Convention on 
Biological Diversity and other relevant agreements.40 Article 10 of the 
Protocol states that “[l]ack of scientific certainty due to insufficient 
relevant scientific information and knowledge regarding the extent of 
the potential adverse effects . . . shall not prevent that Party from taking 
a decision, as appropriate, with regard to the import of the living 
modified organism in question . . . in order to avoid or minimize such 
potential adverse effects.”41  
 Due to the potential breadth of provisions that may be engaged in 
the absence of factual justification (i.e., taking decisions to mitigate 
potential adverse effects when compared with, for example, threats of 
serious or irreversible damage, which is the standard used in Principle 
15 of the Rio Declaration and the Preamble of the CBD) and the 
inclusion of the aforementioned expressions of the precautionary 
principle, numerous commentators concluded that the Protocol’s 
provisions support the adoption of harmonized, precautionary measures 
unique to regulating living biotechnology products.42 Commentators 
also worried that widespread adoption of the Protocol could result in 
potential consumer risks being emphasized over trade interests and the 
progress of biotechnology research.43  Because the “African Group” of 
countries from the continent collectively emphasized the uncertainties 
associated with biotechnology at the negotiating table and argued 
vociferously in favor of national biosafety interests, it is understandable 
that many such commentators feared that precautionary stances (and 
iterations of the precautionary principle) would continue to define 
African national approaches to biotechnology in the wake of the 
 
 39. See id. art. 26(1).  
 40. See Protocol, supra note 3; see also Laurence Graff, The Precautionary Principle, in 
THE CARTAGENA PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY: RECONCILING TRADE AND BIOTECHNOLOGY WITH 
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT? 410, 410–11, 17 (Christoph Bail, Robert Falkner & Helen 
Marquard eds., 2002).  
 41. Protocol, supra note 3, art. 10(6). Article 11 of the Protocol uses virtually identical 
language but focuses instead on LMO-FFPs. See also id. at Annex III.4: “Lack of scientific 
knowledge or . . . consensus should not necessarily be interpreted as indicating a particular level 
of risk, an absence of risk, or an acceptable risk.”  
 42. See, e.g., Graff, supra note 40, at 410. See also Adler, supra note 16, at 175; 
PAARLBERG, supra note 26.  On the harmonizing goals of the Protocol, see, e.g., Jaffe, supra note 
31; see generally John Applegate, The Prometheus Principle: Using the Precautionary Principle 
to Harmonize the Regulation of Genetically Modified Organisms, 9 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 
207 (2001).  
 43. See PETER ANDRÉE, GENETICALLY MODIFIED DIPLOMACY (2007), at 212–13; see also 
W. De Greef, The Biosafety Protocol and the Future of Agbiotech, 22(7) NATURE 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 811 (2004).  
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Protocol’s agreement.44 
B.   The African Union’s Model Law on Biosafety 
The Model Law on Biosafety of the African Union ("Model 
Law”)45 was first drafted in 1999, during a lull in the Cartagena Protocol 
negotiations, to provide a basis for a “harmonized approach towards 
biosafety in Africa [and serve] as a model legal instrument for 
developing national biosafety legislations.”46 A first version of the 
Model Law was agreed upon by representatives from 28 African 
governments in 2001 (subsequent revisions followed in 2006 and 2008) 
to, among other things, specifically address organisms and products not 
regulated by the Protocol. 47  
The Model Law contains non-mandatory provisions that provide a 
model for policy-makers to adopt into national legislation at their 
discretion. The regulatory focus of the Model Law is similar to that of 
the Protocol—genetically modified organisms (GMOs) are defined 
therein as “any organism that possesses any novel combination or 
expression as a trait of genetic material obtained through the use of 
modern biotechnology.”48 The Model Law is not limited to living 
modified organisms, and also includes material not regulated by the 
Cartagena Protocol including non-living food and feed products of 
biotechnology and material developed by a broader class of 
modification techniques.49  The Model Law contains noteworthy 
provisions on public consultation and education,50 GMO and derivative 
labeling (a particularly contentious issue in the Cartagena Protocol 
negotiations),51 and also states that competent authorities should develop 
 
 44. See generally The Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, The Cartagena 
Protocol on Biosafety: A Record of the Negotiations (2004); African Ministerial Conference on 
Science and Technology (AMCOST III) Steering Committee Meeting, Context for Revising the 
AU Model Law on Safety in Biotechnology, 7–8 AU/EXP/STEERING/ST/6(III) (June 6–7, 2007) 
[hereinafter Context for Revising AU Model Law].  
 45. African Model Law on Biosafety, supra note 17; see also African Union, Revised African 
Model Law on Biosafety (Jan. 2008), available at http://www.africa-
union.org/root/au/auc/departments/hrst/biosafety/DOC/level2/DraftRevAMLBS_Jan08_EN.pdf 
[hereinafter 2008 Revised Model Law].  
 46. Id.  
 47. Id.; see also 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45.  
 48. 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45, art. 2. “Organism” is defined therein as “any 
biological entity capable of transferring or replicating genetic material including sterile biological 
entities, viruses, viroids and plasmids” (emphasis added) and “modern biotechnology” is defined 
as (a) in vitro or in vivo modification of DNA, (b) in vitro or in vivo modifications of DNA or 
RNA so as to change any trait of an organism, or (c) cell fusion techniques that “overcome 
natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not techniques used in 
traditional breeding and selection” (emphasis added).  
 49. Id. art. 11.  
 50. See id. art. 7.  
 51. See id. art. 14.  
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measures to create and protect “GMO free zones.”52 The focus here, 
however, will be on the Model Law’s unique risk assessment and 
evidentiary standards. For example, Article 8.5 reads that “[n]o 
approval shall be given by the Competent Authority unless there is firm 
and sufficient evidence that the genetically modified organism or the 
product of a genetically modified organism poses no significant risks to 
the environment, biological diversity or human health.”53 
Even more striking are the provisions related to non-biosafety 
factors to be considered in regulating GMOs. The Model Law states 
that:  
No approval shall be granted for the making, import, use or release 
of a GMO unless the Competent Authority determines that the 
GMO will:  
(a) benefit the country without causing any significant risk to the 
environment, biological diversity or human health;  
(b) contribute to sustainable development; 
(c) not have adverse socioeconomic impacts; and 
(d) accord with the ethical values and concerns of communities and 
does not undermine local community or indigenous knowledge and 
technologies.
54
 
These provisions extend the mandate for regulators far beyond the 
strict biosafety role envisioned by the World Trade Organization and 
beyond even the more generally precautionary provisions of the 
Cartagena Protocol. The language used in the Model Law permits the 
imposition of measures that require concrete evidence of an absence of 
risk in an area where uncertainty and some degree of potential risk are 
almost always the norm.55 Furthermore, these provisions engage broad, 
subjective concepts (e.g., “benefit”, “significant risk”, “sustainable 
development”) that may be difficult to predictably define for product 
developers and regulators alike. These provisions are noteworthy 
because of the breadth and strength of language included to protect 
African biosafety interests;56 indeed, some commentators have found 
 
 52. See id. art. 19.  
 53. Id. art. 8 (emphasis added).  
 54. Id. art. 8.7. “Socio-economic conditions” are defined as “the economic, social or cultural 
conditions, livelihoods, knowledge, innovations, practices and technologies of indigenous and 
local communities including the national economy”; id. art. 2.  
 55. See generally Robin Gregory & Timonthy McDaniels, Improving Environmental 
Decision Processes, DECISION MAKING FOR THE ENV’T 175 (Garry D. Brewer & Paul C. Stern 
eds., 2005); see also Joyce Tait & Les Levidow, Proactive and Reactive Approaches to Risk 
Regulation: The Case of Biotechnology, 24(3) FUTURES 219 (1992).  
 56. See 2008 Revised Model Law, supra note 45, Preamble (“Whereas, with the potential 
risks posed by genetic modification it is consistent with the precautionary principle to regulate 
any undertaking for the making, import, contained use, release or placing on the market of 
genetically modified organisms and products of genetically modified organisms.”) (emphasis 
omitted).  
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that the Model Law’s provisions regulate biosafety in a “stringent and 
precautionary” manner.57 
The extent to which the model provisions of the Protocol and 
Model Law impact national regulation is difficult to assess in the 
abstract. The general impact of these instruments as reifying forces of 
precautionary policy-making, however, may be approximated by 
reference to established biosafety frameworks concluded or modified 
since their introduction. In the sections that follow, this article examines 
the national regulatory approaches of three leaders in the African 
biotechnology sector, namely: South Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso, 
as case studies of agri-biotech policy-making in the wake of these 
agreements.  All three of these nations have introduced (or, in the case 
of South Africa, updated) relevant biosafety regulatory frameworks 
since the conclusion of the subject agreements. Furthermore, all three 
nations have signed and ratified the CBD, are contracting parties to (and 
were involved in the negotiation of) the Protocol, and representatives of 
all three nations have contributed to the discussions leading to the 
agreement and subsequent revisions of the Model Law.  Thus, South 
Africa, Kenya, and Burkina Faso are well placed to serve as case studies 
of regulatory policy-making and biotechnology research and 
development endeavors in the context of the Protocol and Model Law. 
III.  SOUTH AFRICA 
South Africa prioritized investment in agricultural development in 
the wake of apartheid, forming the Agricultural Research Council 
(ARC) and investing heavily in its projects. Due to consistently high 
poverty levels58 and other pressing needs, however, the government 
shifted its focus away from scientific investment and lowered financial 
support for the ARC and other agricultural research institutions in the 
early 2000s.59 While government support for general agricultural 
research has faltered, funding for domestic biotechnology projects has 
increased.60 Public research institutions, joined by a fairly robust private 
sector and regional entities, conduct the majority of the biotechnology 
 
 57. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 25; MEREDITH MARIANI, THE 
INTERSECTION OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, AGRICULTURAL BIOTECHNOLOGY, AND INFECTIOUS 
DISEASE, 201 (2006) (“[T]he provisions of the African Model Law are arguably more protective 
than those of the Biosafety Protocol.”).  
 58. See Frikkie Liebenberg & Johann Kirsten, South Africa: Coping with Structural 
Changes, in AGRIC. R&D IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE? 195, 196 
(Phillip G. Pardey, Julian M. Alston, & Roley R. Pigott eds., 2006).  
 59. While government financial support of scientific research and development has 
increased, there has been a decrease in government funding to the ARC from R337 million in 
1998 to R262 million in 200. See id. at 214.  
 60. See Michael Gastrow, Great Expectations: The State of Biotechnology Research and 
Development in South Africa, 7 AFR. J. OF BIOTECHNOLOGY 342, 345 (2008).  
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research performed in the country.61  
As an early leader in African biotechnology, South Africa was also 
the first African nation to establish regulatory policies on 
biotechnology. Biosafety requirements for biotechnology products were 
first established in 1979 by the South African Committee for Genetic 
Engineering, focusing primarily on laboratory safety.62 The first formal 
field trials on genetically modified agricultural products were not 
conducted until the early 90s, however, and consisted of applications to 
the Department of Agriculture roughly outlining hazards potentially 
associated with the trials.63 Due to a steadily increasing volume of 
applications and the multidimensional concerns involved, the 
Departments of Health, Agriculture, and Environment collaborated to 
formalize the application process and collectively drafted the 
Genetically Modified Organisms Act 1997,64 which was implemented in 
1999 and later updated to its current version in 2007.65  
The lead agency under the GMO Act is the Department of Science 
and Technology (DST) and the prescribed Scientific Advisory 
Committee (SAC), which advises a multidisciplinary Executive 
Committee. The Executive regulates the approval and supervision of the 
development, testing, production, and use of “genetically modified 
organisms,”66 including the testing and approval of GMOs for release or 
importation, for which the Act suggests (but does not mandate) an 
environmental risk (or impact) assessment may be appropriate.67 The 
Act does not elaborate on the content of risk assessments or mandate 
unique analytical steps with respect to GMOs beyond imposing a 
general obligation on users to “ensure that appropriate measures are 
taken to avoid an adverse impact on the environment which may arise 
from the use of genetically modified organisms.”68  
The Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989,69 provides some 
guidance on environmental risk assessments, requiring very generally 
that a proposed action (in this case, the release of a GMO) be compared 
 
 61. See id. at 348.  
 62. See Muffy Koch, Institutional Capacity in the South African Biosafety System, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON BIOSAFETY CAPACITY BUILDING IN E. AND S. AFR. 48, 48 
(2002).  
 63. Id.  
 64. Genetically Modified Organisms Act of 1997 (S. Afr.) [GMO Act].  
 65. See Genetically Modified Organisms Amendment Act of 2006 (S. Afr.).  
 66. “Genetically modified organisms” are defined in the GMO Act, supra note 64, § 1.xiii, 
as organisms “the genes or genetic material of which has been modified in a way that does not 
occur naturally through mating or natural recombination or both,” where “organism” is defined as 
“a biological entity, cellular or non-cellular, capable of metabolism, replication, reproduction or 
of transferring genetic material and includes a micro-organism.” Id. § 1.xx.  
 67. See GMO Act supra note 64, § 5(a).  
 68. Id. § 17(1).  
 69. Environment Conservation Act 73 of 1989 (S. Afr.).  
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to available alternatives in terms of the extent and significance of 
identified environmental impacts.70 The National Environmental 
Management: Biodiversity Act, 2004 (the NEMA),71 pursuant to the 
Protocol, requires that the release of a GMO that “may pose a threat to 
any indigenous species or the environment” not be permitted, unless an 
environmental assessment has been conducted.72 By their inclusion in 
Schedule 1 of the NEMA’s prescribed categories, GMOs can be 
approved on the strength of merely a “basic” risk assessment.73 This 
includes generally considering the particularities of the environment in 
question, the potential impact and cumulative effects of the release, 
measures to mitigate those effects, and information on ongoing 
monitoring and impact-management efforts.74  
Set against this framework, South Africa has the most advanced 
agricultural biotechnology sector on the continent.75 South Africa is the 
eighth largest grower of biotechnological crops worldwide, with 2.1 
million hectares of commercially grown transgenic crops currently 
under cultivation.76 Bt cotton was the first biotech crop to receive 
regulatory approval in 1997, and today, more than 75 percent of cotton 
grown in South Africa is Bt cotton.77 Among the other Bt crops that 
have been researched is white maize, which was adapted from yellow 
maize varieties and is generally more consistent with South African 
diets.78 Furthermore, while all varieties of biotechnological crops 
currently under cultivation were developed off-continent, recent 
transformation events include the transformation of maize to tolerate the 
maize streak virus—the first GM plant developed entirely “by Africans, 
for Africa.”79  
 
 70. Id. § 22. The Regulation also notes that the application must include a consideration of 
the environment in question, the activity, and whether and how the public was consulted. Id.  
 71. National Environmental Management: Biodiversity Act of 2004 (S. Afr.).  
 72. Id. § 78(1).  
 73. National Environmental Management Act of 1998 (S. Afr.).  
 74. Id. § 24(7).  
 75. See Mohohlo Molatudi & Anastassios Pouris, Assessing the Knowledge Base for 
Biotechnology in Southern Africa, 68 SCIENTOMETRICS 97, 106 (2006). Many different measures 
are commonly used to evaluate such a claim, but one widely cited fact is that South African 
researchers regularly account for approximately 40 percent of the biotechnology-related 
publications on the continent.  
 76. See Biotech Update, supra note 5, at 2.  
 77. See R.J. Hillocks, GM Cotton for Africa, 38(4) OUTLOOK ON AGRIC. 311, 313 (2009). 
Approximately 95 percent of South African cotton is produced by 300 large landholding farmers, 
while the other five% is grown on small farms of two hectares or less. The author notes that 75 
percent of South African smallholder cotton farmers were growing Bt cotton as of the year 2000.  
 78. See Gouse, supra note 9, at 87. Gouse suggests that yellow Bt maize was adopted rather 
slowly by South African farmers in part because it was developed from a variety adapted to the 
US environmental and social context, reducing its marketability within South Africa.  
 79. See Sinha Gunjan, GM Technology Develops in the Developing World, 315 SCI. 182 
(2007).  
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While it has thus enacted provisions corresponding to the 
Protocol’s focus on “potential adverse effects,” South Africa, via the 
NEMA, explicitly treats genetically modified plants as products that 
generally exhibit low environmental risk.80 The GMO Act and 
Biodiversity Act mandate unique bureaucratic processes with respect to 
GMOs, but those bureaucratic processes do not appear to subject the 
products to more stringent standards than those employed with respect 
to other products. While some crops may be subject to rejection or 
quarantine due to their particular characteristics as revealed by 
environmental risk assessment, a product’s transgenic or modified 
character does not make it inherently more hazardous than products 
developed by other means.81 By equating GMOs with traditionally bred 
crops and generally eschewing process-based regulation, the South 
African government has adopted a position on biosafety that arguably 
supports the nascent biotechnology industry instead of following the 
“precautionary” tone of the Protocol and Model Law.82   
IV.  KENYA 
The Kenyan economy, like that of many African nations, is 
dominated by its agricultural sector. Due in part to consistently low 
productivity rates,83 agricultural technology and biosafety policy 
development have remained priorities for the Kenyan government over 
the past several decades,84 and have developed in concert as researchers 
and policymakers have recognized the role that biotechnology could 
play in intensifying agricultural production and alleviating poverty.85  
In the late 1990s and early 2000s, well before the introduction of 
statutory biosafety policies, Kenyan researchers attempted to import and 
evaluate biotechnological crops (including trials of sweet potato, Bt 
 
 80. National Environmental Management Act, supra note 73, § 24(7).  
 81. Indeed, once the safety of a particular engineered trait has been ascertained by 
environmental assessment, that trait can be freely backcrossed into other varieties without further 
regulation: See Gouse, supra note 9, at 86.  
 82. As an example of commentary supporting this view, see Context for Revising AU 
Model Law, supra note 44, at 30, where the author notes that “[i]n its broadest contours, South 
African biosafety legislation has tended to follow the permissive regulatory approach of the 
United States” (emphasis added); see also M.O. Makinde, et al., ROLE OF AGRICULTURAL 
BIOTECHNOLOGY IN HUNGER AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1–2 
(2007).  
 83. For example, critics note that Kenyan farmers produce 1.6 tons of dry, refined product 
per hectare of farmland whereas one hectare of farmland in the United States produces nine tons 
of product. See Cohen & Paarlberg, supra note 24, at 81.  
 84. See Republic of Kenya, A National Biotechnology Development Policy 5–6 (2006).  
 85. See Matthew Harsh, Formal and Informal Governance of Agricultural Biotechnology in 
Kenya: Participation and Accountability in Controversy Surrounding the Draft Biosafety Bill, 17 
J. OF INT’L DEV. 661, 661–70 (2005).  
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cotton, and, most notably, Bt maize crops) on several occasions.86 
Applications for field trials of Bt maize were originally subject to 
interim biosafety guidelines established in 1998 by the National Council 
of Science and Technology for confined trials and research on GMOs.87 
These regulations were enforced by regulators generally unfamiliar with 
biotechnology and its products.88 In the end, due to delays in the 
processing of the application, field trials for Bt maize did not actually 
commence until a full decade after the initial application, which 
exemplifies some of the inefficiencies of the early system as well as the 
hazards of a “reactive” approach to biotechnology regulation.89  
The Kenyan Biosafety Act90 (implementing the National 
Biotechnology Policy of 2006) was introduced in 2009; the legislation 
was developed by the National Council of Science and Technology with 
the aid of the IFPRI’s Program for Biosafety Systems and the UNEP 
Global Environment Facility.91 Kenya was the first country to sign the 
Cartagena Protocol at the fifth negotiating Conference of Parties in May 
2000, and was heavily involved in its negotiation.92 It is no surprise 
then, that the provisions of the Biosafety Act closely mirror those of the 
Protocol. Introduced to “establish a transparent, science-based and 
predictable process for reviewing and making decisions on the transfer, 
handling and use of GMOs,”93 the Biosafety Act mandates that GMOs 
may not be imported (nor may GMOs developed within Kenya be 
released from confinement) without first undergoing a multidisciplinary 
safety assessment by the National Biosafety Committee (NBC) and the 
National Council for Science and Technology.94  The NBC assesses and 
evaluates the potential adverse effects (and the likelihood of the effects 
being realized) associated with the release or importation of any new 
 
 86. Id. at 663–64.  
 87. Id.  
 88. See STEVEN WERE OMAMO, BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRICULTURE, AND FOOD SECURITY IN 
SOUTHERN AFRICA 252 (Klaus von Grebmer ed., 2005).  
 89. See Jenna Kryszczun & Steven Were Omano, Workshop Proceedings for the 
FANRPAN-IFPRI Regional Policy Dialogue on Biotechnology, Agriculture, and Food Security in 
Southern Africa, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN S. AFR., (Klaus von 
Grebmer, ed. 2005). Id. at 251; see also Joel I. Cohen, Poor Nations Turn to Publicly Developed 
GM Crops, 23 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 27, 29 (2005) [hereinafter Poor Nations Turn].  
 90. Kenya Biosafety Act, No. 2 (2009), KENYA LAW REPORT § 2.  
 91. See PBS Helps Set the Stage for Biosafety Legislation, PBS KENYA (2008), available at 
http://pbs.ifpri.info/files/2011/09/pbsfs_kenya.pdf.  
 92. See Zachary Mankanya, Grounding Biosafety Regulations in Developing Countries, in 
PROCEEDINGS OF A WORKSHOP ON BIOSAFETY CAPACITY BUILDING IN E. AND S. AFR. 23, 23 
(2002).  
 93. Kenya Biosafety Act, supra note 90, § 4(c). “Genetically modified organism” is defined 
therein as “any organism that possesses a novel combination of genetic material obtained through 
the use of modern biotechnology techniques”, including recombinant DNA techniques and fusion 
of cells beyond the taxonomic family that are not used in traditional breeding. Id. § 2.  
 94. Id. § 20(1).  
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GMO, taking into account considerations such as phytosanitary data 
from exporting countries, the characteristics of recipient and parental 
organisms, the insert and its modification, and information relating to 
the receiving environment and intended use.95 Different regulatory 
standards exist for products destined for confined trials as compared 
with unconfined release,96 and exemptions exist where experience or 
information exist to conclude that the product does not pose a 
significant risk.97  
 Imported GMOs are subject to multi-stage regulation in Kenya; in 
addition to the Biosafety Act, they are also subject to the provisions of 
the Plant Protection Act, administered by the Kenya Plant Health 
Inspectorate Service (KEPHIS).98 KEPHIS regulations prescribe a 
product-focused system with risk assessment and containment 
procedures that vary significantly and which depend expressly on the 
characteristics, species, and intended use of the particular product.99  
Set against this evolving regulatory environment is a growing agri-
biotechnology research community. While commercial crops have not 
yet made their way to African farmers, confined field trials have begun 
for several major crops, including: two trials of cassava transformation 
events; Bt cotton; sorghum; and three events of maize transformation, 
including one developed under the auspices of the Water Efficient 
Maize for Africa project.100 Other recent developments include 
expanded research efforts into tissue culture and marker-assisted 
breeding technology, and concerted efforts to develop national research 
and technology capacity.101 
In spite of its uncertain beginnings, Kenya has established a 
biosafety system that some regard as an exemplary “role model” of 
 
 95. Id. fifth schedule, § 5. These include phytosanitary data from the exporting country, the 
characteristics of recipient and parental organisms, the relevant vector, the insert and its 
modification, the receiving environment, and information relating to its intended use.  
 96. See id. third schedule, § 18(2).  
 97. See id. § 28. These exemptions have been the source of significant criticism from 
biosafety proponents and some NGOs, which note that the provisions could be used to 
circumvent environmental risk assessment without an adequate assessment of the product’s 
potential impact on the Kenyan environment specifically. See Mariam Mayet, Comments on the 
Kenyan Biosafety Bill of 2008, of Kenya, AFR. CENTRE FOR BIOSAFETY (2009).  
 98. See Ann Kingiri & Selfe Ayele, Towards a Smart Biosafety Regulation: The Case of 
Kenya, 8 ENVTL. BIOSAFETY RES. 133, 134 (2009); see also Kenya Biosafety Act, supra note 90, 
§ 3(1), which notes that the requirements of the Act apply in addition to the requirements of other 
relevant Acts.  
 99. See Plant Protection Act, (2012), LAWS OF KENYA Cap. 324 § 8(2)(a); see also Legal 
Notice on the Plant Protection Import Regulation, KENYA PLANT HEALTH INSPECTORATE 
SERVICE (last visited Mar. 14, 2013), available at http://www.kephis.org/plant-import-
requirements-mainmenu-86.html.  
 100. Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops, supra note 8, at 7.  
 101. Id.  
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regulatory development.102 Indeed, some Kenyan biotechnology 
proponents, including scientists and policymakers, consider the 
Biosafety Act and workable biosafety policies implemented thereby, as 
“the key for advancing adoption of biotechnology” in the country, 
particularly amongst farmers.103 The uncertainty and lengthy delays 
associated with early biotechnology products exemplify the importance 
of rapid implementation of formal biosafety policies and a continued 
focus on capacity-building research and regulatory expertise at a 
grassroots level.104  Further observations may be drawn from the fact 
that, though Kenya has adopted policies which closely mirror the 
Cartagena Protocol, its national biotechnology strategy cannot be 
viewed as particularly “precautionary”; government reports have 
emphasized the importance of biotechnology in Kenya’s agricultural 
research strategy105 and some commentators (including numerous anti-
GMO lobbyists) have found that the resultant Biosafety Act provisions 
are fairly permissive and favor the interests of Kenyan biotechnology 
researchers (or at least do not subject research interests to those of 
biosafety proponents).106   
V.  BURKINA FASO 
Burkina Faso’s economy is heavily dependent on the agricultural 
sector, with approximately 80% of the population employed therein.107 
Burkina Faso is the largest sub-Saharan producer and exporter of 
cotton,108 in addition to a variety of staple food crops. Regulators, 
farmers, and scientists alike have generally reacted eagerly to the 
possible incorporation of biotechnological crops into Burkina Faso’s 
agricultural framework. Farmers had Bt cotton test crops in the ground 
in 2003, well before the establishment of legislated regulatory policies 
in 2006.109 Even more troubling to proponents of strong national 
 
 102. See Harsh, supra note 85, at 661.  
 103. See Kingiri & Ayele, supra note 98, at 137.  
 104. See id. at 136–37; Harsh, supra note 85, at 661.  
 105. See generally A National Biotechnology Development, supra note 84.  
 106. See Whither Biosafety? In these days of Monsanto laws, Hope for Real Biosafety Lies at 
the Grassroots, GRAIN (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http;//www.grain.org/article/entries/153-
whither-biosafety-in-these-days-of-monsanto-laws-hope-for-real-biosafety-lies-at-the-grassroots 
[hereinafter Whither Biosafety?}; see also Mayet, supra note 97, at 4.  
 107. See Food and Agric. Org., AGORA: Helping Burkina Faso’s Researchers Develop 
Innovative Agricultural Solutions, AGORA (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.aginternetwork.org/en/free_access_resource_gallery/2010_Sept_15_INERA_case_stu
dy.pdf.  
 108. See Cotton, HARVEST CHOICE (last visited Apr. 10, 2013), available at 
http://harvestchoice.org/commodities/cotton.  
 109.  Elfrieda Pschorn-Strauss, Bt Cotton in South Africa: The Case of the Makhathini 
Farmers, GRAIN (Apr. 26, 2005), http://www.grain.org/article/entries/492-bt-cotton-in-south-
africa-the-case-of-the-makhathini-farmers.  
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biosafety measures, Bt crops were in the ground some months even 
before temporary measures had been formally introduced.110 These 
temporary regulations were concluded by Ministerial Decree, and 
introduced an arguably de-regulatory stance on Bt cotton and other 
biotechnological crops in the interests of promoting scientific capacity 
development and foreign investment. Formal biosafety policies, 
developed by the Ministers of the Environment, Agriculture, 
Commerce, Health, and others,111 followed soon thereafter.  
The current policy for biotechnology products in Burkina Faso, 
which operates under the auspices of the National Framework, include 
“Biosafety Rules” regulating the testing of Bt products. Burkina Faso’s 
biotechnology policies also implicate environmental, health and trade 
legislation.  The National Biotechnology Agency, created through the 
National Biosafety Rules, is tasked with regulating the development and 
transboundary movement of “genetically modified organisms” defined 
simply as organisms with genetic material modified other than by 
means of natural recombination or multiplication.112 The Rules prescribe 
that confined field trials are required for all new uses of GMOs, 
including those intended for research, teaching, or preliminary 
evaluation purposes,113 and that an environmental safety assessment 
must be completed prior to the unconfined release of any GMO in a 
manner consistent with the precautionary principle.114 Environmental 
safety assessments involve the case-by-case classification of GMOs in 
one of three levels according to their potential level of risk as defined in 
regulations.115 
As discussed above, environmental, health, and other legislation in 
place prior to the establishment of the National Biosafety Rules was 
updated thereafter with the express purpose of bringing those 
enactments to bear upon biotech products in Burkina Faso. As such, the 
provisions of the 2006 Loi portant réglementation des semences 
végétales au Burkina Faso, which generally regulates intellectual 
 
 110. See Ronald J. Herring, Stealth Seeds: Bioproperty, Biosafety, Biopolitics, 43(1) J. DEV. 
STUD. 130, 133–34 (2007), for a discussion on the difficulty of controlling the transboundary 
movement of agri-biotech crops (so-called “stealth seeds”) in and amongst groups of farmers in 
Brazil and India.  
 111. Comité National de Biosecurité, Cadre National Pour la Prevention des Risques 
Biotechnologiques au Burkina Faso, ch. 1.2.3 (Ouagadougou: CNB, 2005) [hereinafter National 
Framework].  
 112. Id. ch. 5.2.  
 113. Règles Nationales en matière de Sécurité en Biotechnologie, 2004-
262/PRES/PM/MECV/MAHRH/MS, June 18, 2004, ch. 4 [National Biosafety Rules] (“Elle 
s'effectue obligatoirement après les travaux menés en milieu confiné et après évaluation des 
risques.”). Confined trial conditions are delineated by regulation, and the exact specifications are 
beyond the scope of this article.  
 114. Id. ch. 1.7.  
 115. Id. ch. 1.5.1 (describing confined field trial risk categories).  
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property and biosafety issues associated with the production and use of 
seeds, explicitly include biotechnology products within their ambit.116 
The Act distinguishes between “traditional” and “improved” varieties in 
a product-based manner,117 and mandates that before any new improved 
variety may be released or imported it must first meet regulatory 
standards of nutritional and phytosanitary quality.118 While all other 
pieces of coordinate legislation (including the Seeds Regulations) are 
expressly subordinate to the National Biosafety Rules,119 these 
provisions introduce interesting elements of product-based regulation to 
a system that otherwise expressly subjects biotechnology products of 
biotechnology to process-based scrutiny. 
After five years of evaluation through confined trials, in 2008, 
Burkina Faso became the second African country (after South Africa) to 
approve the commercialization of a crop developed via biotechnology—
Bt cotton was the approved crop in both cases.120 Other biotech crops 
with confined trial approval in Burkina Faso include nutrient-enriched 
sorghum and insect-resistant cowpea,121 but the post-approval adoption 
rate of Bt cotton perhaps best illustrates Burkina Faso’s national 
excitement for biotechnology. The planted area of Bt cotton in Burkina 
Faso rose from 8,500 hectares in 2008 to 125,000 hectares in 2009, and 
further increased to 360,000 hectares (or 70 percent of the total national 
planted area of cotton) in 2010.122  
To contrast Kenya’s experience, Burkina Faso’s example 
illustrates the potentially pro-biotechnology consequences of interim 
biosafety policies, if concluded in the context of de-regulatory policy 
models and in the interest of improving scientific capacity. The relevant 
statutory provisions exemplify process-focused biosafety regulation in 
the model of the Cartagena Protocol,123 but neither those process-
 
 116. Loi Portant Réglementation des Semences Végétales au Burkina Faso, 2006–10, art. 4 
[Seeds Regulations] (“Les activités relatives aux semences issues des biotechnologies modernes 
sont régies par la législation en vigueur.”).  
 117. See id. arts. 2, 3.  
 118. See id. arts. 5, 27.  
 119. The National Biosafety Rules explicitly occupy a preferred position with respect to 
biotechnology products and the many policy instruments that govern their development and use. 
See National Framework, supra note 111, ch. IV (“Parmi ces outils, les Règles Nationales en 
matières de sécurité en Biotechnologie occupent actuellement une place privilégiée.”).  
 120.  Clive James, BRIEF 41 - Global Status of Commercialized Biotech/GM Crops: 2009, 
ISAAA BRIEFS 129, 131 (2009), available at 
http://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/41/download/isaaa-brief-41-2009.pdf.  
 121. See NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 12.  
 122. See Biosafety in Burkina Faso: Ensuring the Safe Rollout of Genetically-Modified 
Cotton, USAID (2010); see also Biotech Update, supra note 5.  
 123. See Whither Biosafety?, supra note 106. Critics note that, in spite of the process-focused 
nature of the regime, the provisions do not support a full analysis of the unique risks associated 
with biotechnology and its products, and that the balance in Burkina Faso’s regulatory system is 
shifted too far in favor of innovation.  
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focused provisions nor the explicit incorporation of the precautionary 
principle within the framework result in a particularly “precautionary” 
approach to biotechnology.  To the contrary, the current policy 
environment contains elements of product-based regulation that have 
served to underpin a dramatic and rapid rise in the uptake and use of 
biotechnological crops in Burkina Faso.   
VI.  CONCLUSIONS 
The last decade has seen some significant changes in policy and 
public opinion with respect to biotechnology in Africa—crops are being 
more widely tested and planted across the continent,124 negative 
biosafety consequences have been rare (where reported at all),125 and 
countries are increasingly moving towards formal biosafety policies.  
As a consequence of this movement, proponents generally recognize 
that “[f]unctional biosafety systems are key to maximizing the benefits 
from biotechnology while demonstrating to stakeholders and the public 
that attendant environmental and health issues are addressed by 
scientific risk assessments.”126 The stakes on regulatory policy decisions 
are extremely high.  On the one hand, much ink has been spilled on the 
possible health and biodiversity concerns associated with 
biotechnology-based products. On the other hand, critics suggest that 
African agriculture must grow by five to six percent each year to be a 
major factor in reducing poverty,127 a monumental task. Furthermore, 
regulatory issues can delay the release of new crop varieties by up to 
nine years and increase costs for transgenic crop approval by up to five 
to eight times more than for conventional crops (between $6 million and 
$15 million for insect-resistant maize and herbicide-tolerant maize, for 
instance).128  
 
 124. See NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 1–2.  It bears mentioning that, in addition to the 
case studies presented herein, Egypt also has one of the leading biotechnology sectors on the 
continent; researchers have Bt maize in the ground and are approaching commercialization of 
transgenic varieties of squash, white maize, and cotton.  
 125.  See Poor Nations Turn, supra note 89, at 29; see also Phillip J. Dale et al., Potential for 
the Environmental Impact of Transgenic Crops, 20 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 567 (2002). An 
excellent example of the changing opinions on transgenic seed is that of the government of 
Zimbabwe, which famously rejected modified food aid as “toxic” in the midst of a famine in 
2002; and at present day, is one of fourteen African nations that has reached the level of confined 
research on agri-biotech products and established laws and regulatory policies specifically for 
monitoring their impact.  
 126. See Harnessing Biotechnology for the Poor, supra note 4, at 244; see also Unesu 
Ushewokunze-Obatolu, Biosafety Policy, in BIOTECHNOLOGY, AGRIC., AND FOOD SECURITY IN 
S. AFR. 157, 160–61 (Steven Were Omano & Klaus von Grebmer eds., 2005).  
 127. See Victor. O. Chude, Links Between Soil Management and Food Security in West 
Africa, FAO 2 (Dec. 5–7, 2012), available at 
http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/user_upload/GSP/docs/WS_managinglivingsoils/Chunde_West_Af
rica.pdf.  
 128. See Peter Beyer, Golden Rice and ‘Golden’ Crops for Human Nutrition, 27(5) NEW 
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African nations were heavily involved in the negotiations leading 
to the Cartagena Protocol; the “African Group” of parties at the 
Cartagena negotiations argued in favor of a broad expression of the 
precautionary principle and broad protections for biosafety interests.129  
Furthermore, participation in the resultant framework for regulating 
LMOs has been widespread; over 45 African countries have ratified the 
Protocol.130 As for the AU Model Law, while few countries have 
adopted its model provisions wholesale, its provisions have informed 
and influenced the national approaches of many African countries.131 
While the agreements play a significant role in decision-making on 
multiple levels, the case studies contained herein demonstrate that they 
do not necessarily serve as reifying forces of either precautionary or 
harmonized policy-making. 
The impact of instruments such as the Protocol and Model Law on 
national policy depends on numerous factors including: histories of use 
of and trade in GMO/LMOs; the policies of neighbors and close-trading 
partners; the character of national policy goals;132 as well as early 
regulatory experiences and the identity of the crops subject to 
regulation.133 These considerations, among many others, contribute to 
the wide breadth of regulatory approaches that define the existing global 
regulatory environment for agri-biotechnology.   
To compare, while Kenya and Burkina Faso explicitly evaluate 
GMOs in a category distinct from other plant products and subject 
GMOs to risk assessment provisions based on their genetically modified 
 
BIOTECHNOLOGY 478, 479 (2010); see also Nicholas Kalaitzandonakes et al., Compliance Costs 
for Regulatory Approval of New Biotech Crops, 25 NEW BIOTECHNOLOGY 509 (2007); see also 
Thomson, supra note 27, at 265. Thomson notes that in circumstances where regulatory oversight 
is disproportionate and informational requirements are extensive, “regulatory costs might exceed 
the costs of research and experimentation to develop a given GE crop.”  
 129. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 7–8.   
 130. NEPAD Biotech, supra note 19, at 2.  
 131. See Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, at 14. For example, Kenya’s 
1999 legal framework adopted the Model Law’s provisions on liability, redress, rehabilitation, 
and cleanup.  
 132. See A National Biotechnology Development Policy, supra note 84, at 6. There are, of 
course, a variety of other international biosafety and trade agreements that may affect policy 
decisions with respect to biotechnology products (including the GATT, TBT, and SPS 
Agreements of the WTO, and the Convention on Biological Diversity) as well as bilateral and 
regional trade agreements that may further complicate matters.  
 133. See Motarim et al., supra note 4, at 41. The contrast is clear between early regulatory 
experiences in South Africa and Burkina Faso, where interim and statutory policies were 
concluded in the context of applications for approval of Bt cotton (and its associated regulatory 
experience and approvals in other nations), and in Kenya, where regulators were initially faced 
with applications for approval of Bt maize (which had struggled to receive regulatory approval in 
other nations due to uncertainty about its safety for human consumption). These examples 
illustrate to some extent the importance of prioritizing investment and conducting research on 
varieties that are well-adapted to national agricultural and social conditions (and well-targeted to 
consumers’ preferences).  
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character, South Africa’s GMO Act mandates unique bureaucratic 
processes for GMOs but equates risk assessment procedures for 
biotechnology products to those of traditionally-bred crops. Kenya and 
Burkina Faso are further distinguishable by subtle differences in their 
respective approaches to process-based regulation—in Kenya, new 
crops are subject to coordinate legislative provisions including the 
Biosafety Act and the product-focused KEPHIS regulations; however, in 
Burkina Faso, elements of product-based regulation are likewise 
brought to bear by supporting pieces of legislation, but are expressly 
subordinate to the National Biosafety Rules.134 
While there are significant differences between the three regimes 
analyzed herein, they are similar in that, although all three are parties to 
the Cartagena Protocol and have adopted at least some measures 
consistent with its provisions, none of the three nations have fully 
embraced the “precautionary” tone of its provisions as envisioned by 
early commentators.135 Indeed, some stakeholders have drawn a contrary 
conclusion, that the “permissive” natures of these countries’ respective 
policy frameworks may emphasize biotechnology research and 
development at the expense of biosafety interests.136 The same holds 
true for the Model Law’s espousal of socioeconomic considerations and 
its risk assessment standards (requiring an “evidence of absence” of 
risk).137 The anticipated impacts of these instruments as models of 
“precautionary” biosafety policy-making have largely not been borne 
out in any of the three nations assessed. The non-restrictiveness of the 
three regimes examined herein generally underscores the broad 
discretion afforded countries to prioritize national policy goals under the 
rubric of agreements such as the Protocol and Model Law. 
Furthermore, while the Cartagena Protocol and Model Law 
frameworks represent attempts to harmonize biosafety policy-making 
on an international and regional scale,138 the policy models of the three 
 
 134. See Kingiri & Ayele, supra note 98, at 134.  
 135. Walter S. Alhassan, Presenting the Sabina Project at the Forum for Agricultural 
Research in Africa, ACCRA 7 (Oct. 5, 2011). It should be noted that the regulatory approaches 
discussed herein comprise three of the most successful biotechnology sectors on the continent, to 
specifically illustrate the possible permissiveness of regulations that are textually in line with the 
Protocol (and elements of the Model Law).  They may be contrasted with national approaches 
concluded in line with the Protocol and Model Law that are decidedly non-permissive, and equate 
biotechnology products with highly precautionary, “inherent” conceptions of risk. See, for 
example, the policies implemented in the West African nation of Mali, one of the few regimes 
directly based on the Model Law, and the interim framework implemented in the nation of Togo. 
 136. See id. (presented at the Forum for Agricultural Research in Africa, Accra, 5 October 
2011, specifically identifying Kenya and Burkina Faso as having “permissive” biosafety systems 
at 7).  
 137. Context for Revising AU Model Law, supra note 44, 11–12.  
 138. See UNEP/GEF BUILDING CAPACITY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE CARTAGENA 
PROTOCOL ON BIOSAFETY 13 (2002). Recognizing the importance of effective biosafety 
10/16/2013 10:58 AM   
2013] African Agricultural Biotechnology Regulation 431 
 
nations examined herein (all of whom are parties to the Protocol and 
have contributed to the Model Law negotiations) take very different 
approaches to implementing their rather inexact provisions. Indeed, as 
non-mandatory instruments that provide policy-making models rather 
than strict standards, the Protocol and the Model Law introduce the 
potential for choice. The resulting diversity of national regimes 
constituting ratified or acceded provisions of the Protocol belies its 
usefulness as an instrument promoting international consistency. The 
same may be said for regionally harmonized African biosafety policy 
and the AU Model Law.   
Finally, these conclusions may contribute to broader discussions 
on the role of harmonization in the context of international and/or 
regional biosafety policy. There is a widespread belief that the 
harmonization of regional biosafety policy (where possible) is 
appropriate and necessary, in the interest of less confusing and less 
expensive (for nations and product developers alike) regulatory burdens 
that will better and more safely control the spread and use of GMOs.139 
While such appeals are undoubtedly well-intentioned and persuasive, 
national appeals for harmonization often propose a particular iteration 
or approach to the issue as “appropriate” or “correct,” be it 
precautionary, permissive, or something unique to an individual 
country.140 Such appeals not only give too little weight to the distinctive 
environmental and agricultural conditions of other nations, they are also 
arguably inconsistent with the general principles of national sovereignty 
and self-determination emphasized in both the Protocol and the CBD.141 
While capitalizing on the regulatory experience of neighboring nations 
 
provisions to agricultural development, the United Nations Environment Program Global 
Environment Facility (UNEP-GEF) developed broad guidelines to help countries establish 
biosafety systems in line with the Protocol’s provisions and in the interests of regional 
harmonization; see generally PAARLBERG, supra note 4, at 129–31. Indeed, the UN-GEF spent 
$74 million dollars between 2000 and 2006 to promote the establishment of biotech-oriented 
biosafety policies and the development of scientific capacity in the developing world, “much of it 
in Africa.”  
 139. General proponents of harmonized approaches include the UNEP, id., the Common 
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA), and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS); see also Samuel E. Timpo, Harmonizing Biosafety Regulations in 
Africa: Surmounting the Hurdles, in AFR. UNION/NEPAD POL’Y BRIEF SERIES (2011); see also 
Munyaradzi Makoni, Africa’s Long Walk to Biosafety, AFR. FILES (Dec. 14, 2009), available at 
http://www.africafiles.org/article.asp?ID=22494; see also Julius Mugwagwa, To Harmonize or 
Not to Harmonize? The Case of Cross-Nat’l. Biotechnology Governance in S. Afr. 6(3) J. OF 
TECH. MGMT. & INNOVATION 2 (2011).  
 140. See Makoni, supra note 139, where the author quotes Jocelyn Webster, the executive 
director of AfricaBio, stating that “[i]f there were harmonized laws, it would become cheaper and 
much better for a region like the SADC as regional countries will accept standards that are 
already set in South Africa.”  
 141. Protocol, supra note 3, at Preamble; CBD, supra note 29, at Preamble. See also A 
Comparative Analysis of Experiences and Lessons From the UNEP-GEF Biosafety Projects, GEF 
BIOSAFETY UNIT 3 (2006).  
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and model policies, such as those of the Protocol and Model Law, can 
be useful (and is often necessary) for nations with emerging biosafety 
systems and limited budgets, parties to international agreements must be 
afforded the latitude to adopt their provisions to national political and 
environmental contexts without having them dictated by other parties—
particularly when the legislated issue is one as contentious as 
agricultural biotechnology. 
